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Tag: Public International Law

Understanding the Authority upon China’s International Lawyers

7. September 2022
A think piece by Michael Liu
In Spring 2019, the People’s Republic’s government selected Dr. Xu Hong as the new top envoy to the Netherlands

More than one year ago, China’s former Ambassador to the Netherlands, Dr. Xu Hong (徐宏) passed away in Beijing at the age of 57. Xu was diagnosed with a malicious cancer a year before and returned to China for treatment shortly after. Xu is a well-known figure among China’s international lawyers. Given the rather late stage of the illness, his death came as less of a surprise than the diagnosis itself. Yet immediately, social media was flooded with memorial notes and tributes to him. The amount of regret for his departure went beyond the common respect for a senior authoritative figure. He was in a high and powerful position (位高权重), but what struck me most was his unusual sincerity.

While saddened by abruptly losing a well-respected figure, I am also intrigued by the question why he is held with such high esteem by China’s international lawyers. Why is he so much missed, and what makes him different? To answer these questions, I interviewed a dozen people in the circle of international law who knew him. Some of them were his colleagues, superiors and subordinates, or “comrades” in the bureaucratic system, some were opponents who didn’t share his views, some were ordinary friends, or just people who had observed him closely, some inside China and its information great firewall (防火墙) and some outside.

Who is Xu?

Xu is better known to China’s international lawyers as Director Xu or Xu Si (徐司) than Ambassador Xu. Prior to the post of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Xu served Director-General of the Department of Treaty and Law of the PRC’s Foreign Ministry (外交部条法司) from 2013 to 2019, which is the top authority on matters of international law in China[1].

For what we know, he is a career diplomat. The Foreign Ministry was his first job upon graduating from Wuhan University in 1985 and only employer in his short-lived life. Xu held several different positions, regularly rotating back to his base, the Department of Treaty and Law, each time on a higher rank. With some pride, he described it as a place with overcrowded and rustic offices, but many important figures in international law when he first joined: “When seeing these senior figurers, I am immensely in awe and felt I am in a sacred palace.” [2]

The State and its lawyers

For a long time, Chinese authorities have been ambivalent and anxious about lawyers’ role in state affairs. Legal professionals are perceived to be influenced by liberalism .[3] Occasionally, the state orchestrated campaigns against “hard core litigant lawyers”(死磕律师). Those who invoke international rules for their cause are also unwelcomed with situations sometimes escalating to a diplomatic crisis for the State.[4] 

While the “sticks” in the hands of Chinese authorities have been better studied, recent research also shed light on the “carrots” side of the mission to create a rank of state-adjacent lawyers. Stern and Liu (2019) found that the state uses different channels to celebrate “the good lawyer”, those who are willing to work closely with the authorities and urge critical colleagues to separate private beliefs from public behavior. Essentially, by curating an appealing state strand of legal professionalism rather than relying on coercion alone, lawyers can participate in politics without opposing the regime.[5] Answering Stern and Liu’s call to examine this further with “varieties of legal professionalism” and different segments of the Chinese bar, this essay looks into how among China’s international lawyers an authoritative figure is established.

To help understand the context, I will use Matthew Erie’s (2021) framing on the exchange between the Party-State and Chinese legal academia, “a relationship that lies at the heart of understanding why and how Chinese scholarship on international law assumes the forms it does”:

“Party-State and international law scholars mutually assist each other for their own benefit. The former obtains expert commentary which is aligned with its political and geostrategic aims. The latter earns access to data and government funding, a phenomenon which I will now turn to”.

For example, in a well observed event among Chinese international lawyers, Xi Jinping made a high-profile visit to the China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) on its sixty-fifth anniversary in 2017. He met with senior legal academics from different universities and made a speech during which he exhorted the students to contribute to building “global rule of law” (世界法治). Reciprocally, Professor Huang Jin, President of CUPL, has proposed that international law be elevated to a “first-level academic discipline” (一级学科) in China, effectively calling for a greater standing of international law scholars in Chinese academia. Professor Huang is also an advocate of applying Xi Jinping Thought to international law. The message that emerged from this exchange is that the Party-State and international law scholars mutually assist each other for their own benefit: The former obtains expert commentary which is aligned with its political and geostrategic aims. The latter earns access to data and government funding.

My interviews confirm that Xu played an important role in both processes: the government’s encouragement for international law academics to strategically use research funding, study areas of international economic law and the law of the sea to best protect China’s interest, as well as enabling access to data for researchers. For instance, Xu’s Department of Treaty and Law has continuously recruited mid-level international law academics to join the rank with temporary affiliations. Institution-wise, the same Department also established a Consultative Committee on International Law during Xu’s tenure, consisting of mostly academic experts.[7]

These efforts pay off. When Chinese legal academics who specialize in the study of international law have rallied to Beijing’s cause when faced with adverse arbitral award in the South China Sea Arbitration Case. In Ku’s (2016) account,

State broadcaster China Central Television America recently reported that “300 Chinese legal experts” reached a “unanimous” opinion that “China should abstain from participating in the case, because the arbitration panel has no jurisdiction over the dispute [and] China has legitimate rights under international law to reject the arbitration.” State news agency Xinhua noted that the China Law Society, an organization which represents all academic lawyers in China, released a similarly unanimous and supportive statement of China’s legal position. Xinhua also recently touted an open letter endorsing China’s legal position signed by hundreds of young Chinese international law scholars studying overseas. And leading Chinese scholars have written essays defending the government’s position.[8]

A year later, the Chinese Journal of International Law, an Oxford University Press journal headed by Professor Yee, a member of Xu’s Consultative Committee on International Law, published an extraordinary 500 page “Critical Study” of the arbitral award by the Chinese Society of International Law (CSIL). The study was hailed as unbalanced,[9] and the Working Report of the Board of Chinese Society of International Law (2013-18) openly reported that it was carried out “under the supervision and leadership of the Foreign Ministry”.[10]

Ku finds that scholars within the Chinese legal establishment have indeed either expressed support for Beijing’s position or have kept silent. Reasons, he argues, are censorship, retribution, and nationalism. My interviews also show in addition to material encouragement and disencouragement, Xu’s personal charisma or mianzi (面子) might have contributed to the standing of Chinese legal establishment in this case.

Schachter described international lawyers as a professional community which, though dispersed throughout the world and engaged in diverse occupations, constitute a kind of invisible college dedicated to a common intellectual enterprise.[11] It seems while China is eager to bolster its standing in this “invisible college”, it is also raising its very own national not so invisible college. Xu is the central figure of these two parallel efforts.  

How did Xu win the respect of China’s international lawyers?

Many interviewees told me that the situation should be de-romanticized before this question can be answered, especially in the Chinese society which emphasizes relationships. There are a lot of pragmatic and realistic aspects behind Xu’s high esteem. All of the interviewees seemed to have their own understanding of this point. A professor with a great deal of practical experience succinctly summed up what he had observed:

First of all, I don’t know him well, but as far as I know, he has a very good reputation in the academic community, and it’s normal for people to think well of him; Second, he is the Director of the Department of Treaty and Law of MFA, and for Chinese international law scholars, he is the biggest owner and distributor of resources, and everyone must say good things about him; third, he is from Wuhan University, and the Chinese international law circle, in a sense, is the alumni circle of Wuhan University.

This was also indirectly confirmed by a former colleague. When I asked him to explain the extraordinarily high number of tributes on WeChat, this former colleague said that Xu was well-connected and had long-standing connections to many because he held this pivotal position for a long period of time. His sudden death shocked many.

But what seems natural to this former colleague may have another dimension. Among Chinese officials, being able to put down their “officialism” and communicate with ordinary people is unusual, especially against the background of the almost insurmountable barriers between those inside and those outside the official system 体制内外. Few pivotal officials are accessible. In contrast, as almost all interviewees stated, Xu was a very humane and good person, had no airs, and was always helping others. This reminds me of how retired Chinese president Jiang Zeming is being affectionally remembered in China. One young interviewee added that Xu drew a strict line between personal time and work time. This made people around him think that he was a humane person (“of flesh-and-blood” 有血有肉的人). Many mentioned that Xu cared about his subordinates and colleagues, respected young people and gave them chances to grow.

His willingness to help others despite his high position surprised people who came into contact with him for the first time. A recent graduate recalled that when she sought advice from him, “not only did he immediately reply to my message, he also immediately introduced me to his colleagues and asked them to follow up. I was dumbfounded at that time. I have never seen such a good person”. A professor who worked briefly with him and his colleagues said that “working with them gave you the feeling that they were there to serve, not to command.”

Another character that sets Xu apart from others is that he is portrayed differently than his diplomatic peers. As many Chinese diplomats as well as the MFA’s spokesperson adopted aggressive language and dogmatism and were therefore dubbed “wolf diplomats”, Xu remained comparably moderate. One interviewed researcher, who is known for his critical stance towards the Chinese government, observed that Xu “speaks with reason, unlike other ambassadors.” In his opinion, Xu’s handling of the South China Sea arbitration shows that although while he must stick to the official political line, he makes efforts to support his position with legal language. The same is true of the document issued later under his leadership regarding the Sino-British Communique concerning Hong Kong. Chinese and foreign observers note that they understand his position and respect his effort to represent it.

It is a sign of Xu’s professionalism that people with different positions appreciate him. But, with the exception of one former colleague, to those who have worked with him, the most memorable traits are is humane attitude and willingness to help others.

Epilogue: Xu in my own eye

Xu and I are members of the same community, but although working on the different front lines of international law, I only had one direct contact with Xu and caught a glimpse of his personality.

In the summer of 2019, I organized the ICC Chinese Moot Court Competition and took around 100 Chinese students and teachers to the Netherlands. Through a friend, I was able to arrange a visit to the Chinese Embassy for our group. It was nice to see the students cheerfully taking photos with Ambassador Xu. Although Chinese embassies often proclaim to be “the home to the overseas Chinese nationals”, those of us who needed to work with them from time to time certainly don’t feel that way. This time, not only did Xu come out himself, he also thoughtfully arranged for the young diplomats in the embassy to come out and meet with students.

On the same day, I spoke to Xu for the first time. Xu knew about the moot court competition before as parts of his team would participate as judges. I expressed my gratitude to him as the organizer of the competition. I will always remember his response. After a brief exchange on the particulars of the competition, he told me that he was concerned that recently the Philippines had been trying to use the court to stir up attention, and asked whether I had noticed. Initially, I did not understand what this had to do with our moot court or my engagement with the Court. Later, I realized that he used our informal channel, the non-governmental organization I represented, to convey his government’s “concern” on Philippines’ move. I then understood better the diplomatic term “concern” and how it works in a multilateral setting with different stakeholders involved. The impression I gathered is Xu might be a sophisticated diplomat who thinks about work all the time.

I am glad I got it half right and half wrong, and I deeply regret that was my only lesson from him in this invisible college.

Michael Liu is a lawyer and civil society activist from China. The NGO that he founded in 2012, “Chinese Initiative on International Law” (CIIL) has been actively engaged in rule of law training, refugee relief and gay rights advocacy in and out of China. The organization has also been granted a consultative status with the United Nations (ECOSOC). Previously, Michael was a victims’ counsel at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Khmer Rouge Tribunal) and worked at the International Criminal Court, the International Committee of Red Cross and a private law firm (Fangda Partners) under various capacities. His PhD project at Leiden University is about the rise of China as a norm shaping force in the global human rights discourse


[1] In addition to the Department of Treaty and Law, the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs (边海司) and the Department of International Organizations and Conferences (国际司) also deal with issues of international law.  

[2] Interview with Xu Hong at the 40th anniversary of international law institute of Wuhan University (武大国际法所四十周年所庆之“校友风云榜”,徐宏大使访谈录:漫漫外交路 拳拳珞珈情) https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/aXs0OiuGUoIQ3aXoZyAFWg accessed 24 March 2022.

[3] See Eva Pils (2018) Human Rights in China: A Social Practice in the Shadows of Authoritarianism, Wiley; Di Wang and Sida Liu (2020) Performing Artivism: Feminists, Lawyers, and Online Legal Mobilization in China’, Law and Social Inquiry 45(3), pp. 678 – 705 678.

[4] Yaxue Cao (2014) The Life and Death of Cao Shunli (1961 — 2014), China Change, 18 March 2014, https://chinachange.org/2014/03/18/the-life-and-death-of-cao-shunli-1961-2014/, accessed 1 April 2022.

[5] Rachel E Stern and Lawrence J Liu (2020) The Good Lawyer: State-Led Professional Socialization in Contemporary China, Law and Social Inquiry 45(1), pp. 226 – 248.

[7] The Editors (2021) In Memoriam: XU Hong (1963-2021), Chinese Journal of International Law 20(1), 217.

[8] Julian G Ku (2016) China’s Legal Scholars Are Less Credible After South China Sea Ruling, Foreign Policy, 14 July 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/14/south-china-sea-lawyers-unclos-beijing-legal-tribunal/, accessed 24 March 2022.

[9] Douglas Guilfoyle (2018) A New Twist in the South China Sea Arbitration: The Chinese Society of International Law’s Critical Study, EJIL: Talk!, 25 May 2018, https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-new-twist-in-the-south-china-sea-arbitration-the-chinese-society-of-international-laws-critical-study/, accessed 24 March 2022.

[10] Work Report by CSIL(中国国际法学会理事会工作报告) on May 22, 2018 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Xv8Kij_bDuqMETULvUfMqg

[11] Swethaa S Ballakrishnen and Sara Dezalay (eds.) (2020) Invisible Institutionalisms: Collective Reflections on the Shadows of Legal Globalisation, Hart Publishing, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing.

General Diplomacy, International Law, Lawyers, Public International Law

Which rules apply? Determining China’s responsibility for the Covid-19 pandemic in public international law

6. August 2021
A new paper by Daniel Laprès
Wikimedia Commons

On December 31, 2019, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission posted a notice on its website about an outbreak of a viral pneumonia outbreak in the city. By July 27, 2021, almost 200 million people across the world were known to have been infected and more than four million had died. The COVID-19 pandemic’s global cost, as estimated in October 2020 by the International Monetary Fund, could reach 28 trillion US dollars over the next five years.

Are there grounds in law to impute state responsibility on China for its role in the spread of the pandemic, and is there evidence for such claims? This paper (available here) focuses on the first question, namely on the framework in public international law governing state responsibility in relation with epidemics.

Under public international law, every internationally wrongful act of a state entails its international responsibility.[1] Such wrongful acts include, among others, violations of general principles of public international law and violations of obligations specifically undertaken vis-à-vis other states. A defendant state may invoke as an excuse for failures to perform any of such obligations the defense of force majeure subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions. Victim states assume responsibility for their own conduct that aggravates harm caused illegally by another state.

General principles of public international law

It has been established that states have a general obligation to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other states.[2] However, there can be no responsibility for a pure act of nature, such as a flood caused by rainfall. An epidemic outbreak of a dangerous disease is generally recognised as such an act of nature, so that a state where one broke out would not be liable on that account alone for its propagation internationally.

On the other hand, although there can be no responsibility for a pure act of nature, as soon as human action or inaction is involved, the problem of responsibility arises. Consequently a flood caused by the breach of a dam, itself caused by heavy rainfall, begs the question to what extent the dam’s construction or operations were catalysts of its breach.[3]

creativecommons.org

China’s obligations under treaties

China might also be held liable for violations of its obligations subscribed under treaties, in this case, most relevantly the International Health Regulations (IHR) adopted under the aegis of the World Health Organization (WHO) by 196 states.[4] The currently applicable IHR, adopted in 2005, entered into effect on June 17, 2007 in the aftermath of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak.

According to its Article 2, the member states retain “the sovereign right to legislate and to implement legislation in pursuance of their health policies”, so the WHO has very little power to impose its desiderata on any recalcitrant member state. For instance, Indonesia refused to share samples of influenza A (H5N1) with the WHO. The country invoked its sovereign right to control matters connected to the outbreak of the disease on its territory as it was concerned that it might not receive a fair share of the benefits of scientific discoveries derived from the virus samples.

The Regulations further stipulate that each member state undertakes to “develop, strengthen and maintain . . . the capacity to detect, assess, notify and report events” as required and that they must notify the WHO within 24 hours of all events which may constitute a public health risk to other states through the international spread of disease and which may require a coordinated international response. When requested by the WHO, member states “should provide, to the extent possible, support to WHO-coordinated response activities”.

If a member state of the WHO were to engage its responsibility in connection with its commitments within the WHO, then it could be pursued by other member states in accordance with the WHO dispute resolution procedures. However, the WHO itself, in its report on its investigative mission to China published in February 2020, has declared that

'In the face of a previously unknown virus, China has rolled out perhaps the most ambitious, agile and aggressive disease containment effort in history. The strategy that underpinned this containment effort was initially a national approach that promoted universal temperature monitoring, masking, and hand washing. However, as the outbreak evolved, and knowledge was gained, a science and risk-based approach was taken to tailor implementation. Specific containment measures were adjusted to the provincial, county and even community context, the capacity of the setting, and the nature of novel coronavirus transmission there.'[5] 

In addition, member states retain the right to refer any dispute about the IHR to the International Court of Justice, provided that each had submitted to its jurisdiction without filing any reservations with respect to the subject matter of the dispute in question; China has not filed any such declarations.

The defense of force majeure

In the event of a claim brought against China for violations of any of its treaty obligations, it could invoke force majeure as a defense. For an event to justify the invocation of force majeure in public international law, a state must demonstrate a link of causality between the event and its failure to fulfil the obligation[6] from which the State claims to be excused[7] and additionally that the event is ”irresistible”, “unforeseeable”, and “external to the party invoking it”.

In short, a State would not be held responsible in public international for the occurrence of an epidemic as an act of nature, but its policies, acts and omissions in its prevention, and management of its propagation, in particular toward foreign countries, could engage its responsibility. If it were established that a Chinese state agency, such as the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV),[8] willingly or negligently introduced COVID-19 into circulation, then the defence of force majeure would not be available since its acts would be clearly within the control of the Chinese State, i.e. not “external”.

On the consequences of contributory negligence

Contributory negligence by the injured party is also held to extinguish the total or partial liability of the operator or the acting state in some multilateral conventions.[9] Contributions to the injury by willful or negligent action or omission of the injured state must be taken into account in determining any due reparations. According to the John Hopkins Corona Virus Resource Center, as of July 27, 2021, in the United States there had been about 126 times more deaths per capita due to COVID-19 than in China, and that is before considering that China’s population is four times larger.[10]

Whatever China’s liability to other countries stricken by the pandemic for its violations of its international obligations might be, the liability to repair the ensuing harm would be reduced, or even entirely offset, to the extent that other states had failed to adopt appropriate and timely measures to prevent and mitigate the harm caused by the pandemic within each of their territories.

Events surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic have demonstrated the limits of the current law to regulate international health. To carry out any missions on the territory of a member state, the WHO must obtain the latter’s consent, which can be withheld at its unqualified discretion for the protection of its sovereignty. A more constraining framework could be adopted by the member states.

Find Daniel A. Laprès’ paper ‘The framework in public international law for determining the responsibility of the People’s Republic of China in connection with the Covid-19 pandemic‘, published in the International Business Law Journal, here. He was Senior Counsel at the Kunlun Law Firm, Beijing from 2008-2019, counsel at the Court of Appeals of Paris, Barrister and Solicitor in Nova Scotia, and an arbitrator on the International List of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC). He authored numerous publications Chinese law, a list of which may be found on his website.


[1] Article 1 of the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf; and the following cases: Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 74, p. 10, at p. 28. See also S.S. “Wimbledon”, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 1, p. 15, at p. 30; Factory at Chorzow, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 21; and Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 29.

[2] Certain activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua, and Certain activities carried out by Costa Rica in the Border Area (Nicaragua v Costa Rica), December 16, 2015, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/152/152-20151216-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf; the passage cited is extracted from the ICJ’s order in this case rendered on December 123, 2013 at para. 19.

[3] P. Reuter, Droit international public, 4th ed., Paris, Presses universitaires de France, coll. Thémis, 1973, p. 115.

[4] Other commitments meriting consideration, though in the end not likely applicable, are those undertaken under articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter, under article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, as well as under the UN Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage of 1972 the UN Convention on Biological Diversity of 1992 and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).

[5] Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), February 16-24, 2020, p. 14, https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf, p. 16. A detailed account of China’s policies and actions to combat COVID-129 may be seen at Institute of Contemporary China Studies Tsinghua University, China’s Fight against COVID-19, April 21, 2020, https://covid-19.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202004/21/WS5e9e2c62a3105d50a3d17880.html.

[6] The international obligation may arise from any “source” of public international law, such as a treaty, a custom, a general principle, a unilateral act, a decision of an international governmental organization, a judgement of the ICJ, an award of an arbitration tribunal. P. Reuter, Droit international public, 4th ed., Paris, Presses universitaires de France, coll. Thémis, 1973, p. 115.

[7] B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, London, Stevens, 1953, p. 228, citing the Permanent Court of International Justice in the cases of the Serbian Loans and the Brazilian Loans (1929), and the rapporteur in the Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (1924-1925).

[8] The Institute was founded in 1956, and put under the administration of the Hubei Commission of Science & Technology in 1970.  In June 1978, it was returned to the jurisdiction of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and it adopted its current title

[9] International Liability for Injurious Consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by International Law, International Liability in case of loss from transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities, (Agenda Item 4) Document 1/CN 4/543, N° 446.

[10] In the United States : 611,151 deaths among a population of 333,071,970 compared with China’s loss of 4,848 for a total population of 1,444,586,267, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html.

General Covid-19, Force Majeure, Public International Law

On Global Constitutionalism and the Community of Common Destiny for Mankind

29. July 2021
A new paper by Björn Ahl
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing Wikimedia Commons

China is stepping up its ambitions to become a norm-making power and its capability to achieve this has become a key question in the debate over the international order. In the realm of international law, the government of the People’s Republic has put forward the concept of a ‘community of common destiny for mankind’ which stresses some long-standing norms of global constitutionalism, neglects others and further introduces new ones to the field.

In order to better delineate China’s plans for international law and to identify the values and structures of the future international legal order envisaged by China, Björn Ahl in his latest paper observed both Chinese legal scholarly debates and government statements revolving around the community of common destiny for mankind as well as global constitutionalism and its substantive ingredients: jus cogens, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Whereas the public debate by no means embodies the full picture of the direction where the PRC’s take on international law is heading towards, it does reveal which elements are accepted and which are rejected.

Although part of that scholarship affirms in general terms the value of the rule of law, human rights and democracy, those who discuss the substantive elements of global constitutionalism in more detail often give them distinctly different interpretations or even refute them.

The Chinese debate on global constitutionalism began with China’s accession to the WTO in 2000. While generally supporting the interpretation of international law in constitutionalist terms, many scholars also point out the dominance of Western viewpoints and call to better align international law with Chinese interests. For instance, peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens), are regarded as one constitutive element of global constitutionalism, however official statements show a very narrow reading of it that is not in line with the scholarly understanding that jus cogens norms have universal binding force and a higher status than ordinary norms of international law.[1] Ahl explains that jus cogens norms as norms imposed on states without their consent empower non-state actors, domestic courts and international tribunals, and are thus not conducive to furthering the interests of authoritarian states like the PRC which seek effective control over the judiciary and civil society.

The rule of law was first officially introduced to the PRC Constitution in 1999 with a significant twist: ‘Socialist rule of law’ emphasizes the supremacy of the party over the law and denies full legal autonomy, features that make it difficult to apply it to the realm of international law. The official debate around the rule of law in China defends the instrumentalist ‘socialist rule of law’ as a legitimate local variation of the international rule of law.

Socialist rule of law is an ideological rather than legal concept, the meaning of which is not determined and/or fleshed out by legislation and the courts but by party documents. […] The concept is a variation of the principle of socialist legality, where stability and flexibility are combined within a dialectical relationship.

A general trend towards democratisation in international law has been widely acknowledged by Chinese authors in the sense of a power shift away from US dominance. They have also claimed that the dominant notion of democracy as well human rights is limited and advocates Western ideology. One strand of arguments projects the Chinese development model onto the global arena, holding that top-down considerations can better serve developmental goals than antagonistic and individualistic rights-based approaches. Through stating that it “offers Chinese wisdom and solutions for global governance of human rights”[2], the government makes it clear that it works towards disseminating its own official human rights approach in order to bring international human rights standards in line with domestic practices.

The concept of the community of common destiny for mankind is in the scholarly discourse at hand regarded as a precondition for recognising a hierarchy of norms in international law. Scholars argue that the community of common destiny concept contains a set of binding principles of international law. Ahl’s paper dives into official and scholarly takes on these principles: for instance is the very prerequisite for the principle ‘durable peace’ found to be sovereign equality including a free choice of political system and development path. The principle ‘universal security’ is regarded to also cover the political risks to authoritarian systems.

The community of common destiny is seen as a new source of legitimacy for international law that is based on the shared interests of the community of states.

He concludes that the reinforcement of the existing order and fundamental change to that order are both components of the community of common destiny concept. Whereas formal aspects of global constitutionalism overall are viewed favourably, it is also criticized as turning a blind eye to US dominance.

Find Björn Ahl‘s full paper ‘Chinese Positions on Global Constitutionalism, Community of Common Destiny for Mankind and the Future of International Law’, forthcoming in the Chinese Journal of Comparative Law, on SSRN here.

Björn Ahl is Professor and Chair of Cologne University’s Chinese Legal Culture. Before joining the University of Cologne in 2012, he was Visiting Professor of Chinese Law, Comparative Public Law and International Law in the China EU School of Law at the Chinese University of Political Science and Law in Beijing. Prior to that he held a position as Assistant Professor of Law in the City University of Hong Kong. He has also worked as Associate Director and Lecturer in the Sino German Institute of Legal Studies of Nanjing University and as a Researcher at the Max Planck Institute of Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg. Find him on LinkedIn.


[1] Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN, ‘Statement by Mr. XU Hong, Director General of the Department of Treaty and Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China at the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly on Agenda Item 78, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-eighth session (Part II: Chapters 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12)’ (chnun.chinamission.org, 27 October 2016) last accessed 18 July 2021

[2] State Council Information Office, ‘Seeking Happiness for People: 70 Years of Progress on Human Rights in China’ (gov.cn 22 September 2019 last accessed 18 July 2021.

General Community of Common Destiny for Mankind, Constitutional Law, Democracy, Global Constitutionalism, Human Rights, International Order, Jus Cogens, Public International Law

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