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Tag: PBoC

Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism

21. May 2021
Opinion by Angela Huyue Zhang

In recent months, Chinese antitrust authorities have ramped up their efforts to rein in Big Tech firms such as Alibaba, Ant Group, Meituan and Tencent.  These enforcement actions were all launched after Jack Ma’s controversial speech criticizing Chinese financial regulation last October. Many have therefore speculated that there are political motivations behind China’s crackdown on Big Tech.  While Ma’s speech may have been the tipping point, there have been long-standing economic, social, and industrial policy issues that merit the government’s action. In fact, Beijing’s recent efforts to strengthen antitrust regulation in the tech sector could facilitate a larger goal of the Chinese government: to become a technology superpower and achieve self-sufficiency, removing reliance on the West.

In this regard, how China handles antitrust law offers it a distinct competitive advantage, particularly compared with the U.S., which is also grappling with how to handle tech giants. Even though efforts to rein in companies such as Google and Facebook have gathered momentum, the U.S. government has significantly less leverage than China when it comes to antitrust law. Indeed, any U.S. legislative changes will take years to enact, and existing antitrust cases brought against Big Tech also face uphill battles in U.S. courts.

China shares some of the same concerns as the U.S. over increasing market concentration in the tech sector. However, Chinese big tech companies do not thrive because they develop innovative technologies. Rather, they build smart apps that make it easier for consumers to connect with merchants. Even though China has emerged at the forefront of e-commerce and digital payment, Chinese Big Tech still owes its success, to a large extent, to China’s vast consumer market.  

Despite their sophisticated software development capabilities, companies such as Tencent and Alibaba have yet to develop foundational technologies. China’s fragility in technological innovation was clearly exposed during the Sino-American trade war—the operations of national champions such as ZTE and Huawei could be easily interrupted if the U.S. government withheld the supply of key components such as semiconductors.

China’s weakness in technological innovation explains Beijing’s recent emphasis on achieving technological self-reliance and its desire to push Chinese tech giants in this direction. Since China is the only country apart from the U.S. to have Internet giants, these tech firms are in a good position to develop digital technologies for the country. In some ways, Chinese tech giants have responded to the government’s call. Tencent has promised to invest $70 billion in new digital infrastructure. In 2019, Alibaba unveiled its first chip to power artificial intelligence. Baidu is betting heavily on driverless cars. 

But Beijing wants more. Its intentions were clearly revealed in a recent editorial by the People’s Daily, a Communist Party mouthpiece, which chided tech firms for investing in the “community group-buying” market. The commentator instead urged Chinese Internet giants to forge ahead with higher ambitions, such as advancing technological innovations to clear China’s bottleneck in the intensive Sino-American rivalry, rather than focusing on selling cabbages.

In the meantime, antitrust law enforcement gives Beijing significant regulatory leverage to push its tech firms in the direction it desires. Antitrust law grants the central government strong sanctioning powers, allowing it to impose anything from astronomical monetary fines to severe structural remedies. The Chinese antitrust regulator also possesses vast administrative discretion while being subject to little judicial oversight. Furthermore, Chinese antitrust law enforcement is spearheaded by a central ministry that follows the central government’s directives carefully.   

As Chinese tech giants have amassed significant market power, they have become vulnerable to antitrust regulatory attacks. And just as U.S. and EU regulators are tightening their antitrust scrutiny over Big Tech, the Chinese antitrust authority also has perfectly legitimate reasons to do so. The regulatory vulnerability of Chinese Big Tech, in turn, facilitates their cooperation with Beijing to help the latter achieve its goals, be it in antitrust or other industrial policy matters.  Thus, Chinese Big Tech can and do align their business development strategies with the government’s industrial policy as a form of self-protection.

Indeed, the Chinese government views antitrust law as a powerful multipurpose tool not only for tackling monopolies, but also for achieving a wide variety of policy objectives, such as maintaining price stability, industrial planning, and trade and foreign policy. Thus, the absence of checks and balances in Chinese antitrust enforcement, supposedly an institutional weakness, could actually be a strength for Beijing as it pushes tech giants and the country toward achieving technological self-sufficiency.

Angela Huyue Zhang is the director of the Center for Chinese Law and Associate Professor of Law at the University of Hong Kong. She is the author of Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism: How the Rise of China Challenges Global Regulation, published by Oxford University Press in March 2021.  This opinion is an abridged version of an opinion that was first published with Fortune: China antitrust: How regulation helps it compete with the U.S. | Fortune.

General Alibaba, Antitrust Law, Big Tech, PBoC, Regulation

The financial credit information system and China’s evolving data protection law

1. March 2021
A new paper by Lu Yu and Björn Ahl
The headquarters of the People’s Bank of China in Beijing, supervising entity of the financial credit information system

How is data protected in the evolving Social Credit System? Both, social credit and Chinese data protection law is diverse and fragmented, making the search for an answer to this question a complicated endeavour. Lu Yu and Björn Ahl dive into one arguably most sophisticated arm of the Social Credit System, that is, the financial credit information system (FCIS) in their new article “China’s evolving data protection law and the financial credit information system: court practice and suggestions for legislative reform” (free draft here).

The FCIS is not only one of the most mature parts of the overall SCS, as it regulates private entity’s data collection, it also features stricter and clearer data protection rules than those Social Credit subsystems that include data collection by state organs. Most importantly, Chinese data protection law requires data subjects’ consent to the collection and further transfer of personal data. The authors have found the consent requirement to be incompatible with the functions and purposes of the FCIS, with data subjects having no real choice, as consent is linked to obtaining the financial service in questions. Hence, future rounds of reform should establish exceptions to the consent requirement.

In their article “China’s evolving data protection law and the financial credit information system: court practice and suggestions for legislative reform” (free draft here) the authors investigate the limits that Chinese data protection law imposes on the FCIS. The FCIS receives both financial credit data from financial institutions and public data from public authorities. Yu and Ahl analyse the legal framework and how data protection rules are applied in court practice, including the preconditions for and levels of protection afforded data subjects’ rights and the legal consequences of any violations of those rights. Although the courts have adopted differing approaches to the interpretation of data protection law, the authors find that they have established consistent practice in protecting data subjects against the transfer of incorrect negative data. Chinese data protection law provides for neither an effective legal basis nor for limits on the collection and transfer of public data by public authorities. The Information Security Technology – Personal Information Security Specification (2020, hereafter: Specification) provides comprehensive protection for the personal data processed by all organisations, including public authorities, but it is only a recommended standard that lacks binding authority. Although the 2012 Regulations on the Administration of the Credit Investigation Industry grant data subjects a number of rights, the courts have difficulties applying the data protection rules in practice. In sum, there is a need in both the private and public sectors for nationally applicable, binding and more sophisticated data protection rules.

→ What is the FCIS? Different public authorities organise and maintain their own credit systems. The FCIS is one system at the national level that is supervised by the People’s Bank of China and functions as a public credit registry. It draws on financial credit data, the discredited judgment debtor list system operated by the SPC, which concerns individuals or entities refusing or failing to comply with an effective court judgement; and the information system operated by the China Securities Regulation Commission in relation to capital market activities. Founded in 2006, the FCIS is a predecessor of the Social Credit System: Pursuant to the Interim Measures for the Administration of the Basic Data of Individual Credit Information, the FCIS collects and stores individual credit data to provide inquiry services to commercial banks and individuals. It further offers information to be used for the formulation of currency policy, financial supervision and other purposes provided for by law. Hence, the purpose of the FCIS is twofold: to inform financial institutions for the purpose of reducing credit risks and to provide information to regulators to support policy making. At the end of 2018, the FCIS held personal data concerning 980 million natural persons.

Progress was recently made with the introduction of personal data protection to the new Civil Code, and a comprehensive data protection law is currently on the legislative agenda. Because the Specification has already established a sound model by providing very detailed data protection rules, the future comprehensive data protection law should address the processing of data by public authorities and further refine the already established data protection principles in the Cybersecurity Law and Specification. Improvements in data protection, in particular the regulation of data sharing between public authorities, could serve to balance social governance and individual rights and contribute to enhancing the legitimacy of the overall SCS.

Lu Yu is a research assistant at the chair of Chinese Legal Culture of Cologne University. She is about to submit her dissertation on European and Chinese data protection law to the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen where she has conducted research since October 2017, after working as a legal counsel with Rödl & Partner in Guangzhou. Reach out to her at yuluna5(at)gmail.com.

Björn Ahl is Professor and Chair of Cologne University’s Chinese Legal Culture. Before joining the University of Cologne in 2012, he was Visiting Professor of Chinese Law, Comparative Public Law and International Law in the China EU School of Law at the Chinese University of Political Science and Law in Beijing. Prior to that he held a position as Assistant Professor of Law in the City University of Hong Kong. He has also worked as Associate Director and Lecturer in the Sino German Institute of Legal Studies of Nanjing University and as a Researcher at the Max Planck Institute of Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg. Find him on LinkedIn.

General Data Protection, Financial Credit, PBoC, Social Credit System

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