A new paper by Alexandr Svetlicinii and Jing Wen
Historically, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) approach to export controls has been shaped by its international obligations under multilateral non-proliferation regimes. Even amid geopolitical tensions, China’s adherence to multilateralism in this domain was reinforced in its 2021 White Paper on export controls. It was not until geopolitical tensions further escalated and various forms of economic restrictions proliferated that the PRC moved to modernise its export controls by adopting the 2020 Export Control Law.
China’s export control system has undergone systematic restructuring. The items subject to export controls were previously scattered across various regulatory instruments and were then consolidated into a single, unified control list. On the institutional side, a centralized governance hub was established, with the State Council and the Central Military Commission overseeing policy formulation, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) carrying out the enforcement, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, and other agencies aiding in enforcement, thus ensuring a more centralized and systematic approach to export control governance. Additionally, the reformed regulatory framework incorporates the “watch list” and “control list,” which operate in synergy with the “unreliable entity list” administered by MOFCOM.
Strategically, China developed a distinctive “few but precise” approach to designating items subject to export control. In stark contrast to the lengthy lists of controlled items maintained by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the European Union, China’s unified control list contains about 700 items, focusing on strategic products and associated technologies. These include critical minerals such as gallium, germanium, tungsten, and indium, as well as several categories of rare earth elements, including samarium, gadolinium, and terbium, which are crucial for high-end sectors such as semiconductors, new energy, and advanced weapons manufacturing. By leveraging its control over these resources, China strengthened its bargaining power in global supply chains and bolstered its retaliation potential.
Furthermore, the PRC maintains a flexible mechanism that allows for transitioning between temporary and permanent controls, which is conducive to both responding to geopolitical shifts and stabilising trade flows. For example, graphite products transitioned from temporary control in 2006 to permanent control focused on high-end graphite materials in 2023, with exemptions for ordinary industrial graphite. This approach ensures targeted protection of strategic interests while preserving space for regular trade.
As critical technologies and strategic resources from China are integrated into global production networks, it has become evident that controlling them solely within the PRC’s territory is insufficient to achieve regulatory objectives. As a result, the 2024 Regulation on the Export Control of Dual-use Items provides for the extraterritorial application of PRC export control rules in relation to foreign-made products that contain PRC-origin dual-use items, goods produced abroad using PRC technology, and the transhipment of PRC-origin dual-use items. This framework draws inspiration from the U.S. export controls, such as the minimum content rules and the Foreign Direct Product Rules. However, it is not a mere replication but adapted to fit China’s non-proliferation obligations and national security interests. For example, foreign products containing components originating in the PRC, even if assembled abroad, must comply with PRC export control regulations if they contain controlled items. Similarly, control over PRC technology used abroad focuses on strategic technologies such as high-performance drones and semiconductors. The export control regulations further introduce defensive measures against the extraterritorial application of foreign export controls. Chinese companies are prohibited from cooperating with inspections launched by foreign governments without prior approval from the MOFCOM.
The transformation of China’s dual-use export control regime is not just an update of domestic regulations. It demonstrates that the PRC reshapes export controls with a substantial effect on global supply chains. The asymmetries and overlaps between China’s export control systems and those of other countries pose substantial compliance challenges for multinational corporations. The lack of clear extraterritorial applicability thresholds and the inherent flexibility of national security criteria further complicate matters, creating commercial and compliance risks for enterprises as they make decisions about supply chain configurations, technological cooperation, and other business strategies.
The full paper, titled China’s Export Control of Dual Use Items: From Multilateralism to Extraterritoriality, is published in the Global Trade and Customs Journal, vol. 21/2026. This research was supported by the University of Macau Multi-Year Research Grant MYRG-GRG2023-00209-FLL “Regulation of the Dual Use Goods in International Economic Law”. Alexandr Svetlicinii is an Associate Professor of Global Legal Studies at the University of Macau, Faculty of Law. He can be contacted at alexandrs@um.edu.mo. Jing Wen is a Master of Laws candidate at the University of Macau, Faculty of Law.